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Abstract
Currently there is a growing literature exploring the features of optimal monetary
policy in New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. With respect
to time consistent policy, the literature focuses on solving for allocations. Recently, how-
ever, King and Wolman (2004) have examined implementation issues involved under time
consistent policy when the monetary authority chooses nominal money balances. Surpris-
ingly, they ﬁnd that equilibria are no longer unique under a money stock regime. Indeed,
there exist multiple steady states. We ﬁnd that their conclusion of non-uniqueness of
Markov-perfect equilibria is sensitive to the instrument of choice. If, instead, the mon-
etary authority chooses the nominal interest rate rather than nominal money balances,
there exists a unique Markov-perfect steady state and point-in-time equilibria are unique
as well. Thus, in their language, monetary policy is implementable using an interest rate
instrument while it is not implementable using a money stock instrument.
∗ We would like to thank Alex Wolman for many useful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, or the Federal Reserve System. We can be reached at michael.dotsey@phil.frb.org
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Currently there is a growing literature exploring the features of optimal monetary policy in
New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. Generally, the literature fo-
cuses on solving for allocations. Recently, however, attention has been paid to analyzing more
decentralized policies, and this paper is part of a growing investigation studying implementa-
tion of planning problems. We believe that this is an important area of inquiry, because the
institutions responsible for setting policies rarely have direct control over allocations. It is,
therefore important to understand whether or not a planner’s allocations are obtainable with
a given institutional structure.
For the case of time-consistent policies that are Markov-perfect, King and Wolman (2004)
have examined implementation issues when the monetary authority uses a nominal money
balances instrument. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd that equilibria are no longer unique under a money-
supply regime. Indeed, there exist multiple steady states. The non-uniqueness stems from
strategic complementarities introduced through the policy process itself. For example, if agents
believe that money and the price level will be high in the future, it is optimal for money and
prices to be high today. Thus, expectations can be self-fulﬁlling and there exist more than one
Markov-perfect equilibrium outcome.
In this paper we demonstrate that King and Wolman’s (2004) result of a non-unique Markov-
perfect equilibrium is sensitive to the choice of instrument. If the monetary authority chooses
the nominal interest rate instead of nominal money balances, there exists a unique Markov-
perfect steady state and point-in-time equilibria are unique as well. Essentially, using an interest
rate instrument weakens strategic complementarities and restricts the money growth process in
such a way that multiplicities of both steady state and point-in-time equilibria are ruled out.
Simply put, choosing the interest rate constrains the anticipated evolution of the price level.
Agents are not currently free to assume any future price level, and this constraint rules out the
self-fulﬁlling equilibria that are present with a money-supply instrument. Thus, there is less
scope for one ﬁrm’s pricing strategy to inﬂuence another’s.
These results, that money instruments yield a determinant equilibrium in rational expecta-
tions model, while interest-rate instruments do not, seemingly turn the results of Sargent and
Wallace (1975) on their head. Note, however, that we are dealing with diﬀerent uniqueness
issues. Our approach, together with King and Wolman (2004), is concerned with the global
uniqueness of the current period equilibrium conditional on future equilibrium outcomes. As
such we are dealing with potential non-linearities in the competitive equilibrium characteriza-
tion. Sargent and Wallace (1975), on the other hand, are concerned with the local uniqueness
1of the linear approximation of the dynamic rational expectations equilibrium. For the case of
an interest rate policy, our restriction to Markov-perfect equilibria picks one equilibrium out of
the continuum of possible rational expectations equilibria.1 The restriction to Markov-perfect
equilibria is then analogous to McCallum’s (1983) minimal state variable solution.
The paper proceeds as follows. First we brieﬂy describe a standard New-Keynesian economy,
which is identical to the one used by King and Wolman (2004). We then explore time-consistent
Markov-perfect policy. We brieﬂy review the King and Wolman (2004) result and then investi-
gate how using an interest rate instrument overturns the conclusions of their analysis. We note
that a full decentralization cannot be obtained if the equilibrium concept is Markov perfect. A
brief summary concludes.
2 The economy
T h e r ei sa ni n ﬁnitely lived representative household with preferences over consumption and
leisure. The consumption good is produced using a constant-returns-to-scale technology with
ac o n t i n u u mo fd i ﬀerentiated intermediate goods. Each intermediate good is produced by a
monopolistically competitive ﬁrm with labor as the only input. Intermediate goods ﬁrms set
the nominal price for their products for two periods, and an equal share of intermediate ﬁrms
adjusts their nominal price in any particular period. Also, in what follows we restrict our
analysis to perfect foresight economies.
2.1 The representative household





t [lnct − χnt], (1)
where χ ≥ 0,a n d0 < β < 1. The household’s period budget constraint is
Ptct + Bt + Mt ≤ Wtnt + Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Vt + Tt, (2)
where Pt is the nominal price level, Wt is the nominal wage rate, Bt and Mt are the end-
of-period holdings of nominal bonds and money, Tt are lump-sum transfers, and Rt−1 is the
gross nominal interest rate on bonds. The agent owns all ﬁrms in the economy, and Vt is
1Giannoni and Woodford (2002a, 2002b) have investigated the local implementation of allocations originating
from optimal policy under full commitment.
2nominal proﬁti n c o m ef r o mﬁrms. The household is assumed to hold money in order to pay for
consumption purchases
Mt = Ptct. (3)
We will use the term “real” to denote nominal variables deﬂated by the nominal price level,
which is the price of the aggregate consumption good, and we use lower case letters to denote
real variables. For example, real balances are mt ≡ Mt/Pt.
The relevant ﬁrst order conditions of the representative household’s problem are
1/ct = λt (4)








Equation (4) equates the multiplier on the households budget constraint, λ, with the marginal
utility of consumption. Equation (5) states that the marginal utility derived from the real wage
equals the marginal disutility from work. Equation (6) is the Euler equation, and states that
if the real rate of return increases, then the household increases future consumption relative to
today’s consumption.
2.2 Firms
The consumption good is produced using a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods as
inputs to a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Producers of the consumption good behave
competitively in their markets. There is a measure one of intermediate goods, indexed j ∈ [0,1].








where ε > 1. Given nominal prices P (j) for the intermediate goods, the nominal unit cost and








For a given level of production, the cost-minimizing demand for intermediate good j depends
on the good’s relative price, p(j) ≡ P(j)/P,
yt(j)=pt (j)
−ε ct.( 9 )
3Each intermediate good is produced by a single ﬁrm, and j indexes both the ﬁrm and good.
Firm j produces y(j) units of its good using a constant-returns technology with labor as the
only input,
yt(j)=nt(j).( 1 0 )
Each ﬁrm behaves competitively in the labor market, and takes wages as given. Real marginal
cost in terms of consumption goods is
ψt = wt. (11)
Since each intermediate good is unique, intermediate goods producers have some monopoly
power, and they face downward sloping demand curves (9). Intermediate goods producers set
their nominal price for two periods, and they maximize the discounted expected present value
















yt+1 (j).( 1 2 )
Since the ﬁrm is owned by the representative household, the household’s intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution is used to discount future proﬁts. Using the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm’s demand
function (9) and the household’s intertemporal rate of substitution, the ﬁrst order condition



















where μ = ε/(ε − 1) is the static markup with ﬂexible prices.
2.3 A symmetric equilibrium
We will assume a symmetric equilibrium; all ﬁr m st h a tf a c et h es a m ec o n s t r a i n t sb e h a v et h e
same. This means that in every period there will be two ﬁrm types: the ﬁrms that adjust
their nominal price in the current period, type 0 ﬁrms with relative price p0,a n dt h eﬁrms that
adjusted their price in the previous period, type 1 ﬁrms with current relative price p1.T h e
current relative price p1,t is related to last period’s relative price p0,t−1 through the inﬂation
rate πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1
p1,t = p0,t−1/πt. (14)
Each period half of all ﬁrms have the option to adjust their nominal price.
The equilibrium of the economy is completely described by the sequence of marginal cost,




































mt = ψt/χ (19)
2.4 Distortions and optimal policy
Allocations in this economy are suboptimal because of two distortions. The ﬁrst distortion
results from the monopolistically competitive structure of intermediate goods productions: the
p r i c eo fa ni n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di sn o te q u a lt oi t sm a r g i n a lc o s t . T h ea v e r a g em a r k - u pi nt h e
economy is the inverse of the real wage, P/W, which is, according to equation (11), the inverse
marginal cost 1/ψ. The second distortion reﬂects ineﬃcient production when relative prices are
diﬀerent from one. Using the ﬁrm’s demand function (9) and aggregate production (7) we can
obtain the total demand for labor as a function of relative prices and aggregate output. Solving
aggregate labor demand for aggregate output we obtain an ‘aggregate’ production function









where for ease of exposition we will drop time subscripts when possible and denote next period’s
values by a prime. Given the symmetric production structure, equations (7) and (10), eﬃcient
production requires that equal quantities of each intermediate good are produced. The degree
of allocational ineﬃciency is reﬂected in the term a ≤ 1. The allocation is eﬃcient if p0 = p1 =
a =1 .
The policymaker is assumed to maximize lifetime utility of the representative agent, taking
the competitive equilibrium conditions (15)-(19) as constraints. For a time-consistent Markov-
perfect policy it is furthermore assumed that the policymaker takes future policy choices as
given and that policy choices are functions of pay-oﬀ relevant state variables only. Because,
there are no state variables in our example this amounts to the planner maximizing the current
period utility function of a representative agent and choosing an unconditional value for the
policy instrument. Taking future policy as given means that the planner has no control over
future outcomes such as future relative prices or allocations.
Typically, one states the problem in terms of the planner choosing the competitive equi-
librium allocation. Alternatively, the planner chooses the relative price p0. The choice of p0
5determines p1, equation (15), and allocational eﬃciency, equation (20). The choice of p0 also
determines marginal cost, equation (16), and thereby consumption, equations (5) and (11). Fi-
nally, given consumption and allocational eﬃciency employment is determined, equation (20).
In this model, with ε =1 1 , implying a markup of approximately 10 percent, and χ =1 /1.1
the optimal allocation consumption of consumption and labor is .9996 and 1.0 respectively.
Thus, there is very little allocational ineﬃciency. This allocation implies an inﬂation rate of
1.82 percent and a nominal interest rate of 2.84 percent.
3 A Markov-perfect money supply policy
King and Wolman (2004) show that decentralizing the planning problem so that the planner
chooses a policy rule based on money leads to problems. In particular, they assume a homo-
geneous monetary policy rule that sets the nominal money stock in proportion to the preset
nominal price from the last period
M =˜ mP1 (21)
Combining the policy rule (21) with the money demand equation (3) yields the modiﬁed policy
rule in real terms
c =˜ mp1 (22)
Finally, combining (22) with the optimal labor supply condition (5) yields the equilibrium
condition for marginal cost
ψ = χ˜ mp1. (23)
We now revisit the King and Wolman (2004) result, which indicates that for most values of
the money-supply policy parameter, ˜ m, the steady state will not be unique. Since in a Markov-
perfect equilibrium without state variables the expected future policy has to be a steady state,
non-uniqueness of the steady state alone suggests that the monetary policy rule may result in
indeterminacy of the competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There exist values ˜ mmin < ˜ m∗ =1 /(χμ) ≤ ˜ m∗∗ such that (1) if ˜ m ∈ (˜ mmin, ˜ m∗]
then there exists a unique non-inﬂationary steady state; (2) if ˜ m ∈ (˜ m∗, ˜ m∗∗),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t
two inﬂationary steady states; (3) if ˜ m =˜ m∗∗ then there exists a unique inﬂationary steady
state; and (4) if ˜ m>˜ m∗∗ then no steady state exists.
Proof. Substitute (23) for marginal cost in (16) and obtain the following steady state mapping







6In steady state, the nominal interest rate, R > 1, and because βR = π, π > β. For π ∈ (β,1],
h(π) is strictly increasing and less than one. For positive inﬂation, π > 1, the function h
satisﬁes (1) h(π) >h (1) = 1 and (2) h(∞)=1 .S i n c e h is continuous the function must
eventually be decreasing if it is to approach 1 as π →∞ . So there must exist an inﬂation rate
π∗∗ such that h(π) ≤ h∗∗ = h(π∗∗).L e t˜ m∗ =1 /(χμ) and ˜ m∗∗ =˜ m∗h∗∗. The lemma follows
immediately from the properties of the h function.¥
Figure 1 displays the steady state inﬂation rates π consistent with the money rule ˜ m for
the parameter values β =0 .99, ε =1 1 ,a n dχ =1 /1.1.N o t e t h a t˜ m∗ is the steady state
money-supply policy parameter associated with a constant price level.


































Figure 1. Steady State Multiplicity with a Money Rule
King and Wolman (2004) discuss the presence of strategic complementarities that arise
under time-consistent policy. If price-setting ﬁrms expect that the policymaker will try to
implement an outcome with positive inﬂation, then because of the strategic complementarities,
two diﬀerent levels for the optimal relative price and therefore two diﬀerent levels of marginal
cost are possible equilibrium outcomes. This in turn implies that any choice of the money
supply instrument that tries to implement a positive inﬂation rate cannot uniquely determine
the inﬂation rate: in general, two distinct outcomes are possible. We will see that this result
is diﬀerent from the case of an interest rate rule which essentially ﬁxes the expected inﬂation
rate, and in turn marginal cost.
7We now deﬁne a reaction function that describes how an individual ﬁrm sets its price in
response to anticipated aggregate outcomes. For this purpose combine (16) and (17) and rewrite





Primes denote next period’s values. The left-hand side of this expression is the optimal relative
price chosen by a particular price adjusting ﬁrm conditional on the expected inﬂation rate. The
expected inﬂation rate, however, does depend on the pricing decisions of all other ﬁrms (17).
King and Wolman (2005) argue that for the above introduced money supply rule the reaction
function exhibits strategic complementarities: if other ﬁrms decide to set a higher relative
price, it is in the interest of an individual ﬁrm to also set a higher relative price. Strategic
complementarities in turn may result in equilibrium indeterminacy.
A simple illustration of King and Wolman’ result, that there are multiple equilibria for
a money stock rule, can be obtained by looking at the case when both current and future
policymakers choose the same policy rule, ˜ m =˜ m0 ∈ (˜ m∗, ˜ m∗∗). T h i sp o l i c yi sc o n s i s t e n t
with the existence of two steady state equilibria. Furthermore, conditional on choosing future
behavior to be in accord with one of the two possible steady states, there exist two equilibria
in the current period. Together with the policy rule (23) and the deﬁnition of the inﬂation rate











where an overbar indicates an aggregate variable.
Note that equation (15) provides a unique solution for the relative price of the ﬁrm that






¢1/(1−ε) for p0 > p
¯
0 =( 1 /2)
1/(ε−1) < 1.( 2 6 )








1. This in turn
implies that the g-term of the reaction function in terms of the relative price p0 intersects the
45-degree line at p0 =1 , and is above (below) the 45-degree line when p0 is less than (greater




































Finally equation (29) can be shown with some some additional algebra.
It is thus easily shown that for ˜ m ∈ (˜ m∗, ˜ m∗∗) the LHS and the RHS. of expression (25)
will in general intersect twice. On the one hand, from Lemma 1 it follows that since ˜ m>˜ m∗,
the constant term in equation (25) is greater than one, μχ˜ m>1. Thus the LHS. deﬁnes a
line through the origin with slope less than one, that is, below the 45-degree line. On the
other hand, the RHS. of (25) intersects the 45-degree line at p0 =1 ,a n ds t a y sa b o v e( b e l o w )
the 45-degree line whenever p0 is less than (greater than) one. Furthermore, as p0 becomes
arbitrarily large the RHS. of (25) converges to the 45-degree line from below.
Since the LHS. is strictly below the RHS. for p0 ≤ 1, the two curves do not intersect in this
range. We know that at least one intersection point exists since we consider policy rules that
are consistent with the existence of a steady state, and the steady state price is a solution to
the reaction function (25). Thus there must be an intersection point for p0 > 1.
If ˜ m =˜ m∗, then we know that a unique non-inﬂationary steady state with p0 =1exists,
and this steady state also satisﬁes (25). For this case, the LHS. is the 45-degree line and the
RHS. has a unique intersection with the 45-degree line at p0 =1 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,f r o m ( 2 9 ) i t
follows that the slope of the RHS. at p0 =1is negative. With a marginally larger value of ˜ m,
the slope of the LHS. becomes less than one, and there will be at least two intersection with
the RHS. to the right of p0 =1 .
Figure 2 displays the reaction function for the money rule conditional on the parameteriza-
tion used in Figure 1 and assuming that next period’s policy generates a steady state inﬂation
rate π∗ =1 .05. We summarize our discussion in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose the current and future policymakers use the same money stock rule ˜ m.I f
˜ m ∈ (˜ m∗, ˜ m∗∗), then, in general, at least two competitive equilibria exist. If ˜ m =˜ m∗ then the
competitive equilibrium is unique.

















































Figure 2. Reaction function for money rule
4 A Markov-perfect interest rate policy
In this section we perform a careful evaluation of the beneﬁts of using an interest rate instrument
for Markov-perfect policies. Even though we ﬁnd policy-induced strategic complementarities,
we ﬁnd that steady states and point in time equilibria are unique. In what follows, we solve
for the current equilibrium conditional on current policy R and future equilibrium outcomes
Y 0 =( p0
0,p 0
1,ψ
0). To begin, we show that the equilibrium reaction function again exhibits
strategic complementarities.







which combines (17) and (18). Substituting the marginal cost equation (30) into the optimal













This reaction function also exhibits strategic complementarities, that is, the right-hand side of
equation (31) is increasing in p0, but these strategic complementarities are not strong enough
10to induce multiple competitive equilibria.2 I fw ec o m p a r e( 2 5 )a n d( 3 1 )w es e et h a ti nt e r m so f
their dependence on the price chosen by price adjusting ﬁrms the two reaction functions diﬀer
only in the ﬁrst term of the numerator. Whereas for them o n e ys t o c kr u l et h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo f
goods declines as the price of the price adjusting ﬁrms increases, this term remains constant
for the interest rate rule. Compared with the money rule reaction function this means that
even for low values of p0 the interest rate rule reaction function is suﬃciently steep to prevent
the occurrence of multiple intersections of the LHS and RHS expressions. Figure 3 displays the
reaction function for the interest rate policy conditional on the parameterization used in Figure
1 and assuming that next period’s policy generates a steady state inﬂation rate π∗ =1 .05.











































Figure 3. Reaction function for interest rate rule
In order to prove existence and uniqueness of a (steady state) competitive equilibrium we





















Conditional on next period’s equilibrium outcome (p0
1,ψ
0), equation (30) and (32) determine
current marginal cost ψ and the proﬁt maximizing choice for the relative price p0.
2One can show that the h function is increasing in p0 if R>1/β; that is, the policy is inﬂationary.
11We will ﬁrst demonstrate the existence of a unique steady state conditional on a given
nominal interest rate. We then show that for any current interest rate there exists a unique
equilibrium if future expected monetary policy is inﬂationary or deﬂationary and equilibrium
indeterminacy occurs only if the expected future monetary policy maintains stable prices.
Lemma 3 Conditional on the nominal interest rate R > 1, there exists a unique steady state
p∗
0 = p0 = p0
0, p∗
1 = p1 = p0
1, ψ
∗ = ψ = ψ
0.






1 = βR. (33)
Equations (15) and (33) uniquely determine the steady state relative prices (p∗
0,p ∗
1).F r o m












For the special case of the non-inﬂationary steady state with stable prices, π∗ =1 ,t h e r ea r e





1 =1 . (35)
From (34) it then follows that marginal cost is equal to the inverse static markup
ψ
∗ =1 /μ. (36)
W en o ws h o wt h a taz e r oi n ﬂation steady state cannot be implemented as a unique equilib-
rium under an interest rate instrument.
Lemma 4 If next period’s policy choice attains a steady state outcome with stable prices, then
(1) the current period equilibrium is indeterminate if current policy also tries to attain the
stable-price steady state βR =1 ; (2) no current period equilibrium exists if βR 6=1 .
Proof. The current period equilibrium is deﬁned by equations (30) and (32) where next period’s
















0 and ψ = p0/μ.
If current policy is inﬂationary or deﬂationary, βR 6=1 , then the only solution to (37) is p0 =0 .
But p0 =0is not a feasible outcome, so no equilibrium exists.¥
Lemma 5 If next period’s policy choice attains an inﬂationary or deﬂationary steady state
outcome, then (1) for any nominal interest rate for which a current period equilibrium exists it
is unique, and (2) there always exists a nominal interest rate for which an equilibrium exists.
Proof. The current equilibrium is deﬁn e db yt h et w oe q u a t i o n s( 3 0 )a n d( 3 2 )w h i c hm a pt h e
current period relative price p0 to current period marginal cost ψ. Rewriting (32), we have the
following two equations:

















An intersection of the two functions represents a potential equilibrium. The two functions
always intersect at p0 =0 ,b u tp0 =0is not a feasible outcome. Both functions are strictly



































The sign of the term A0 depends on the inﬂationary stance of next period’s steady state
policy. From (16) we get
βA









































13The ﬁrst equality uses the steady state expression for next period’s marginal cost (34), and
the second equality uses the steady state expression for next period’s inﬂation rate (33). Thus
A0 is negative if next period’s policy is inﬂationary, π0 > 1,a n dA0 is positive if the policy is
deﬂationary, π0 < 1.
Since the function f1 is linear and the function f2 is strictly concave or convex, if an intersec-
tion between f1 and f2 exists for positive values of p0, it is unique. Suppose that next period’s
policy is inﬂationary, that is, the function f2 is concave. Then the two functions intersect for

















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p0=0
This condition can always be satisﬁed for a suﬃciently large nominal interest rate R ≥ 1.I n
other words the policymaker can always ﬁnd an interest rate for which the functions intersect.
Recall that there is a lower bound for feasible relative prices p0, equation (26), so the poli-
cymaker has to choose an interest rate that implies a suﬃciently large value for the relative
price p0. A policymaker can always ﬁnd such an interest rate, since he can always replicate the
steady state by choosing R = R0. Thus there exists a choice for R such that an equilibrium
e x i s t sa n di ti su n i q u e .A na n a l o g o u sa r g u m e n ta p p l i e si fn e x tp e r i o d ’ sp o l i c yi sd e ﬂationary.¥
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has analyzed the importance of the monetary policy instrument in decentralizing
a time-consistent planner’s optimal policy. In that regard, it is part of growing literature
investigating the implementation of optimal plans. We have shown that whether a planner
uses a money instrument or an interest-rate instrument is crucial for determining if optimal
Markov-perfect allocations can be attained via the appropriate setting of the instrument. King
and Wolman (2004) were the ﬁrst to alert us to the nontrivial ramiﬁcations of decentralization.
They produced a surprising result of signiﬁcant impact, namely that decentralization is a non-
trivial problem and with regard to using a money instrument implementation of the optimal
allocation is unattainable. A time-consistent planner using a money instrument could not
achieve the allocations chosen by a planner who was able to directly pick allocations. In
fact, they showed that steady states and equilibria were not unique at the optimal inﬂation
rate. Since, in reality, no central bank picks allocations this result presented a challenge for
understanding just how a time-consistent central bank might operate.
Intuition gained from the early rational expectations literature on monetary policy as de-
picted in Sargent and Wallace (1975) would suggest that an interest rate instrument would
14have similar problems. Here we have shown that it does not. A planner using an interest-rate
instrument can achieve the Markov-perfect allocations of the standard time-consistent planning
problem The result occurs for two key reasons. The interest rate instrument pins down future
inﬂation in ways unobtainable using a money instrument, and in so doing reduces the degree
of strategic complementarity that arises from the time-consistent policy problem itself.
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